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ABSTRACT
GENERALIZED ID-BASED ELGAMAL SIGNATURES
AND EXTENSIONS
Said Kalkan
M.S. in Computer Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
July, 2008
ID-based cryptography helps us to simplify key management process in tra-
ditional public key infrastructures. Any public information such as the e-mail
address, name, etc., can be used as a public key and this solves the problem
of obtaining the public key of a party and checking that its certificate is valid.
ID-based cryptography has been a very active area of research in cryptography
since bilinear pairings were introduced as a cryptographic tool. There have been
many proposals for ID-based signatures recently. In this thesis, we introduce the
concept of generalized ID-based ElGamal signatures and show that most of the
proposed ID-based signature schemes in the literature are special instances of this
generalized scheme. We also investigate ID-based signatures providing additional
properties. Signature schemes with message recovery provide the feature that the
message is recoverable from the signature and hence does not need to be trans-
mitted separately. Blind signatures provide the feature that a user is able to get
a signature without giving the actual message to the signer. Finally, signcryption
schemes fulfill the job of a digital signature and encryption in a single step with
a lower computational cost.
We generalize the ID-based signatures providing these properties and obtain
numerous new signatures which have not been explored before. The generalized
ID-based signatures we described provide a unified framework for ID-based El-
Gamal signatures and extensions. Additionally, some of our blind signatures turn
out to be more efficient than the previously proposed schemes.
Keywords: ID-Based Signature, Blindness, Message Recovery, Signcryption.
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O¨ZET
GENELLES¸TI˙RI˙LMI˙S¸ KI˙MLI˙K TABANLI ELGAMAL
I˙MZALARI VE EKLENTI˙LERI˙
Said Kalkan
Bilgisayar Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Selc¸uk
Temmuz, 2008
Kimlik tabanlı kriptografi, geleneksel ac¸ık anahtar altayapılarındaki anahtar
yo¨netim su¨rec¸lerinin basitles¸tirilmesinde kullanılır. Genele ac¸ık her tu¨rlu¨ bilgi,
o¨rneg˘in e-posta adresi, ad-soyad ac¸ık anahtar olarak kullanılabilir. Bu sayede,
bir grubun ac¸ık anahtarını elde etme ve bu anahtarın sertifikasının gec¸erli olup
olmadıg˘ını kontrol etme su¨rec¸leri problem olmaktan c¸ıkar. I˙kidog˘rusal es¸lemelerin
kriptografide kullanılmaya bas¸lamasından sonra, kimlik tabanlı kriptografi c¸ok
aktif bir aras¸tırma alanı olmus¸tur. Son zamanlarda c¸ok sayıda kimlik tabanlı
elektronik imza o¨nerileri sunulmus¸tur. Bu tezde, genelles¸tirilmis¸ kimlik tabanlı
ElGamal imza yo¨ntemlerini sunuyoruz ve genelles¸tirilmis¸ yo¨ntemin literatu¨rdeki
kimlik tabanlı imza yo¨ntemlerinin bir c¸og˘unu kapsadıg˘ını go¨steriyoruz. Bunun
yanında, ekstra o¨zellikler sunan kimlik tabanlı imzaları da inceliyoruz. I˙mzadan
mesajı yeniden ins¸a etmeye olanak sag˘layan imza yo¨ntemlerinde mesajın imzadan
ayrı olarak go¨nderilmesine gerek yoktur. Go¨rmeden imza yo¨ntemi bir kullanıcının
imzalatmak istedig˘i mesajı, imzalayacak kis¸iye vermeden o mesajı imzalatmasına
olanak sag˘lar. I˙mzala-s¸ifrele yo¨ntemi, elektronik imza ve s¸ifrelemenin tek bir
adımda daha az is¸lem gu¨cu¨ kullanılarak yapılmasını sag˘lar.
Bu tezde, ekstra o¨zellikler sunan kimlik tabanlı imzalama yo¨ntemlerini
genelles¸tirdik ve birc¸ok daha o¨nce o¨nerilmemis¸ imza yo¨ntemi elde ettik.
O¨nerdig˘imiz genelles¸tirilmis¸ kimlik tabanlı imzalar, kimlik tabanlı ElGamal
imzaları ve eklentileri ic¸in genel bir taslak olus¸turuyor. Ek olarak, bazı go¨rmeden
imzalama yo¨ntemlerimiz daha o¨nce o¨nerilmis¸ yo¨ntemlerden daha hızlı c¸alıs¸ıyor.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Kimlik Tabanlı I˙mza, Go¨rmeden I˙mzalama, I˙mzadan Mesaj
Olus¸turma, I˙mzala-S¸ifrele Yo¨ntemi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [?] introduced the concept of ID-based cryptography to sim-
plify key management procedures in public key infrastructures (PKI). Following
Joux’s [?] discovery on how to utilize bilinear pairings in public key cryptosys-
tems, ID-based cryptography has become one of the most active research areas in
cryptography and numerous ID-based encryption, signature and key agreement
schemes have been proposed, mostly using bilinear pairings.
In a traditional public key cryptosystem, the user has to obtain a digital
certificate issued by a Certificate Authority (CA). A digital certificate contains the
public key and identity of the user and proves that the public key in the certificate
belongs to the user’s identity. To achieve this, the validity of a certificate should
be verified by checking the certificate revocation list published by the CA. Usually
public key infrastructure is hierarchical and many CAs are involved between the
sender and receiver, hence the entire certificate path has to be verified. Therefore
obtaining the public key of a party and checking that its certificate is valid is the
main problem in traditional public key cryptosystems.
ID-based cryptography helps us to simplify the key management process in
traditional PKIs. In ID-based cryptography, any public information such as e-
mail address, name, etc., can be used as a public key. Since public keys are derived
from publicly known information, their authenticity is established inherently and
1
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there is no need for certificates in ID-based cryptography. The private key for a
given public key is generated by a trusted authority (TA) and is sent to the user
over a secure channel. Furthermore, public and private keys do not have to be
generated at the same time, so Alice can send an encrypted message to Bob even
before Bob obtains his private key. After Bob receives the encrypted message, he
can ask the TA for his private key corresponding to his identity.
Simplified key distribution and non-requirement for public key directories
make ID-based cryptosystems advantageous over traditional PKIs. However,
there is an inherent key escrow problem in ID-based cryptosystems: Since the
TA generates private keys, the TA inherently knows the private keys of the users.
Also, the private keys need to be sent to the user over a secure channel. Key re-
vocation is another problem in ID-based cryptosystems, however, it can be solved
by concatenating an expiration date to the identity of the user.
Digital signatures are the most commonly used public key cryptographic
tool in online applications. They provide integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation. Integrity is ensuring that the message has not been changed by
unauthorized entities; authentication is ensuring that the recipient can confirm
the identity of the sender; and non-repudiation is ensuring that a communicating
party cannot deny previous signatures and contracts.
In specific scenarios, some additional properties may be needed. For example,
the blindness property is used in many applications such as electronic voting and
electronic payment systems. By using blind signatures, the user is able to get a
signature from an authority without revealing the actual message to the signer.
Signatures with message recovery can be preferred if bandwidth is a concern
and the message length is small. In signature schemes with message recovery, the
message is not transmitted together with the signature, and is recovered according
to the verification process.
Signcription schemes, which combine the functionality of an encryption and
a signature in a more efficient way, can be used if confidentiality is needed. Con-
fidentiality is keeping the information secret from unauthorized entities.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
The ElGamal signature scheme has been used as a key tool for constructing
ID-based signature schemes. It has already been widely used for digital signatures
and lots of variants were introduced after ElGamal’s original proposal [?]. Horster
et al. [?] integrated all these variants into a unified framework and obtained nu-
merous variants of the original ElGamal signature scheme. ElGamal signatures
with message recovery were proposed by Nyberg and Rueppel [?, ?]. Blind ElGa-
mal like signatures were introduced by Camenisch [?]. Horster et al. [?, ?] also
integrated these variants and produced numerous blind and message-recovery
signatures.
1.1 Previous Work
In 1984, Shamir [?] introduced the concept of ID-based cryptography and he pro-
posed an ID-based signature scheme based on the integer factorization problem.
However, he could not find a practical ID-based encryption scheme. Later in 1986
Fiat and Shamir [?] proposed practical solutions for ID-based identification and
signature schemes. In 1988, Guillou and Quisquater [?] proposed an ID-based
signature scheme based on their zero knowledge protocol.
Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [?] used bilinear pairings to reduce the dis-
crete logarithm problem on elliptic curves to the discrete logarithm problem in
a finite field. This reduction was used to find weakness in elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems and was called the MOV reduction. After Joux [?] discovery on how to
utilize bilinear pairings in public cryptosystems, bilinear pairings were introduced
as a cryptographic tool and ID-based cryptography became a very active area of
research. In his paper, Joux proposed the first one-round protocol for tripartite
Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Finding a practical ID-based encryption scheme remained an open problem
until Boneh and Franklin [?] proposed the first ID-based encryption scheme from
bilinear pairings in Crypto 2001. In the same year Cocks [?] proposed an ID-based
encryption scheme based on quadratic residues.
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The first ID-based signature scheme from bilinear pairings was proposed by
Sakai, Ohgisi and Kasahara [?] in 2000. However, they did not provide a security
analysis. Paterson [?] proposed an ID-based signature scheme in 2002 which can
be seen as an ID-based version of original the ElGamal signature. In Paterson’s
paper there was a brief security analysis but no rigorous proof. In 2002, Hess [?]
proposed a provably secure ID-based signature scheme, which is secure against
adaptively chosen message and fixed ID attacks. Yi [?] proposed a different ID-
based signature scheme with brief security arguments in 2003.
In 2003, Cha and Cheon [?] proposed a provably secure ID-based signature
scheme. They also provided a security definition for ID-based signature schemes
and proved that their scheme is secure against adaptively chosen message and ID
attacks.
In 2005, Barreto et al. [?] proposed a different provably secure ID-based sig-
nature scheme which is much more efficient than previously proposed schemes.
They achieved this by changing the definitions of public and private keys. Their
construction can be applied to most of the previous schemes to get more efficient
signature schemes.
In 2006, Paterson and Schuldt [?] proposed an ID-based signature scheme.
The novel feature of their signature is that the security proof of the signature
does not depend on random oracles.
Sometimes a digital signature itself does not satisfy users’ requirements and
additional properties may be needed. If bandwidth is short and signature length
is important, signature schemes with message recovery may be useful. RSA sig-
natures [?] can be used with message recovery, since signature and encryption
functions are inverse of each other. First signature scheme with message recov-
ery based on the ElGamal signature was proposed by Nyberg and Rueppel [?]
in 1993. Since then several other message recovery signatures have been pro-
posed [?, ?, ?, ?]
The first ID-based signature scheme giving message recovery was proposed by
Zhang et al. [?] in 2005. They also gave a partial message recovery signature for
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arbitrary length messages in their paper.
Tso et al. [?] proposed a different message recovery signature in 2007. They
used the ideas of Barreto et al.[?] and changed the definitions of public and private
keys. Thus, they obtained much more efficient signature schemes. They proved
that their scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model.
Blind signatures are needed if a user wants to obtain a signature from an
authority without revealing the actual message to the signer. Chaum [?] intro-
duced the concept of blind signatures in 1982. Then in 1993, Camenisch et al. [?]
showed that the ElGamal signature and its message recovery variant can be used
to get a blind signature based on the discrete logarithm problem.
First ID-based blind signature was proposed by Zhang and Kim [?] in 2002.
They improved the efficiency of their scheme and proposed a different blind signa-
ture scheme in 2003 [?]. Then in 2005, Huang et al. [?] proposed a more efficient
blind signature.
In previous schemes two rounds were needed in the protocol between the user
and the authority to get a blind signature. In 2007, Gao et al. [?] proposed a one-
round ID-based blind signature scheme by sacrificing computational efficiency.
Additionally they showed that their scheme is provably secure without using
random oracles.
If confidentiality is also important, then signcryption schemes may be helpful.
These schemes are much more efficient than the signature followed by encryption
approach. Zheng [?] introduced the concept of signcryption in 1997. He coined
the term signcryption to mean a primitive which simultaneously fulfills the job of
a digital signature and encryption in a single step with a significantly lower cost.
Since then several other signcryption schemes have been proposed [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?].
The first ID-based signcryption scheme was proposed by Malone-Lee [?] in
2002, however, there are security flows in the scheme. Libert and Quisquater [?]
pointed out the problems in Malone-Lee’s scheme and proposed a new ID-based
signcryption scheme in 2003. Since then, several different signcryption schemes
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are proposed by Boyen [?], Nalla and Reddy [?], McCullagh and Barreto [?],
Chen and Malone-Lee [?]. In 2005, Barreto et al. [?] proposed the most efficient
provably secure signcryption scheme so far by changing the definitions of the
public and private keys.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Cryptographers have been using bilinear pairings as a cryptographic tool since
1993. At first bilinear pairings were used to reduce the security of elliptic curve
based cryptosystems. Menezes, Okamoto, Vanstone [?] and Frey, Rueck [] devel-
oped the MOV and FR attacks respectively. These attacks reduce the discrete
logarithm problem (DLP) on certain elliptic curves to the DLP in a finite field.
Bilinear pairings’ existence were believed to be a bad thing until Joux [?]
discovered that they can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing cryptosys-
tems. After that, ID-based cryptography became very popular in the literature
based on bilinear pairings.
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group of order q generated by P . Let G2 be a
cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. An admissible bilinear pairing is
defined as e : G1 ×G1 → G2 with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(aR, bS) = e(R,S)ab where R,S ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zq. This
can also be stated as ∀R, S, T ∈ G1 e(R + S, T ) = e(R, T )e(S, T ) and
e(R,S + T ) = e(R,S)e(R, T )
2. Non-degeneracy: The map e does not send all pairs in G1 × G1 to the
identity of G2. That is e(P, P ) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(R,S) for
any R,S ∈ G1
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The Weil pairings and the Tate pairings of elliptic curves are examples of such
admissible bilinear pairings.
1.2.2 Model of ID-based Signatures
An ID-based signature scheme consists of four algorithms:
• Setup: The private key generator (PKG), a trusted authority, chooses the
global secret key, computes the global public key and publishes it with other
system parameters.
• Extract: PKG verifies the user’s identity and computes user’s public and
private key. The private key should be sent to the user over a secure channel
after this phase.
• Sign: An algorithm which takes the message m, user’s private key, and
other public parameters as input, and outputs the signature on m.
• Verify: An algorithm which takes the sender’s identity, a signature, and
other public system parameters as input, and outputs 1 if the signature is
valid. Otherwise it outputs 0.
1.3 Problem Definition
The ElGamal signature scheme can be used as a key tool for constructing ID-based
signature schemes. Most of the ID-based signatures in the literature [?, ?, ?, ?]
can be seen as variants of the basic ElGamal signature. However, providing a
unified framework for these signatures has not investigated so far. The problem
we address in this thesis is how to obtain a generalized ID-based signature scheme
that provides a unified framework for previously proposed signatures.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
We use the ElGamal signature to obtain an ID-based signature scheme. Then
we show how the basic ID-based ElGamal signature scheme can be extended into
a generalized ID-based signature. We discuss which variants are not possible
and which variants are not secure in the ID-based setting. We also present some
original variants which were not possible on the basic ElGamal scheme.
We extend our work to provide additional properties to our signature schemes.
We investigate ID-based signatures providing message recovery. We show how the
basic ElGamal signature with message recovery can be converted into an ID-based
signature with message recovery. We extend our ID-based signature scheme into
a generalized ID-based message recovery signature. We also present some original
variants which were not possible in the non-ID-based setting. Then, we modify
some of our signatures to get more efficient signature schemes.
ID-based blind signatures are also investigated in this thesis. We show how
a modified blind ElGamal signature can be converted into an ID-based blind
signature. We give a blindness proof for the resulting signature. We extend our
basic ID-based blind signature scheme into a generalized ID-based blind signature.
We discuss which variants are not possible in the ID-based setting. Then, we
give an efficiency comparison of our signature with previously proposed blind
signatures.
Lastly, ID-based blind signcryption schemes are investigated. We show how
an ID-based signature scheme can be converted into an ID-based signcryption
scheme. Then we generalize the idea and obtain signcryption schemes from our
ID-based signatures.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
In Chapter 2, we investigate the generalized ID-based ElGamal signatures. El-
Gamal signature and its variants are discussed in Section 2.1. We explain how
to convert the original ElGamal signature into an ID-based signature scheme in
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Section 2.2. We generalize the basic ID-based ElGamal signature scheme in Sec-
tion 2.3. Security and efficiency of this generalized scheme are discussed section
2.4 and 2.5. We show how to embed previously proposed signatures into our
generalized scheme in Section 2.6.
In Chapter 3, we investigate ID-based signature providing message recovery.
ElGamal signatures with message recovery are discussed in Section 3.1. We de-
scribe the basic ID-based ElGamal signature with message recovery in Section
3.2. In Section 3.3, we describe the generalizations of the basic scheme. We
modify some of these schemes and produce more efficient signatures in Section
3.4. We show how to embed previously proposed signatures into our generalized
scheme in Section 3.5.
In Chapter 4, we discuss ID-based blind signatures. Blind ElGamal signatures
and its generalizations are discussed in Section 4.1. We describe the basic ID-
based blind signature scheme and its blindness proof in Section 4.2. In Section
4.3, we describe the generalizations of the basic scheme. We modify some of
these schemes and produce more efficient signatures in Section 4.4. We give
an efficiency comparison between some of our schemes and previously proposed
signatures in Section 4.5.
In Chapter 5, we discuss ID-based signcryption schemes. We show how an ID-
based signature scheme can be converted into an ID-based signcryption scheme
and describe the basic ID-based signcryption scheme in Section 5.2. In Section
5.3, we describe the generalizations of the basic scheme. We modify some of these
schemes and produce more efficient signcryption schemes in Section 5.4.
The thesis is concluded with a discussion of the proposed schemes in Chap-
ter 6.
Chapter 2
Generalized ID-based ElGamal
Signatures
In this chapter, we use the original ElGamal signature scheme to get an ID-based
ElGamal signature scheme. Then we generalize the ID-based ElGamal signature
scheme and propose various ID-based signature schemes based on the original one.
We called our signature schemes as generalized ID-based ElGamal signatures. We
use the ideas of Horster et al. [?] and bilinear pairings. Some of the variants found
in this process were already proposed in literature but we also introduce some
new types of variants that were not proposed before.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 ElGamal Signature Scheme
Let p be a large prime and g be a generator of Z∗p. The user chooses α ∈ Zp−1 as his
private key and then computes β = gα mod p as his public key. The parameters
p, g, and β are public whereas the user keeps α secret. To sign a message, the
user generates a random k ∈R Zp−1. Then he computes r = gk mod p and
s = k−1(m− rα) mod (p− 1). The (r, s) pair is the signature of message m. The
10
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equation
m ≡ ks− rα (mod p− 1)
called signature equation and verification is done by checking the congruence
gm
?≡ βrrs mod p. Security of ElGamal signature relies on the discrete logarithm
problem (DLP) since solving α from β or s from r,m, β can be reduced to solving
DLP in Z∗p.
2.1.2 The Meta-ElGamal Signature Scheme
Horster et al. [?] showed that many variations of the basic ElGamal signature
are possible by modifying the signature equation. Instead of using ElGamal’s
original signature equation, one can use the general equation
A ≡ αB + kC mod q
to obtain a signature, where (A,B,C) is a permutation of the parameters (m, r, s),
q is a divisor of p− 1, and g is an element in Z∗p of order q. The signature can be
verified by checking the equation:
gA
?≡ βBrC (mod p)
By these permutations six possible signatures can be obtained.
Different signature schemes can also be obtained by using different coefficients
instead of just using the permutations of (m, r, s). The coefficients (A,B,C) can
be chosen as a permutation of (mr, s, 1), (mr,ms, 1), (mr, rs, 1), or (mr, s, 1).
Additionally the signs of (A,B,C) can be changed by multiplying them by ±1.
Then the signature equation will be
±A ≡ ±αB ± kC (mod q)
where (A,B,C) is a permutation of the coefficients mentioned.
The generalization can be extended further by choosing A,B,C as general
functions of m, r, s, instead of just products of two. The functions must be cho-
sen carefully to guarantee the solvability and security. To guarantee solvability,
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it is necessary that the parameter s can be extracted from the equation. To guar-
antee security, the parameters m, r, s have to occur in at least one of the three
coefficients. Also, the insecure rs and ms variants should be avoided.
An insecure rs variant occurs if (A,B,C) is taken as a permutation of
(rs,m, 1): For some message m, an attacker chooses a random c ∈R Z∗q and
substitutes it for rs in the verification equation and computes r. Then he com-
putes s as s = cr−1. The (r, s) pair will be a valid signature for the message
m.
An insecure ms variant occurs if (A,B,C) is a permutation of (ms, r, 1):
Assume that (r, s) is a valid signature observed by an adversary for some message
m. For an arbitrary message m′, the adversary computes s′ as s′ = m′−1ms and
takes r′ = r. Then (r′, s′) will be a valid signature for m′.
2.2 The Basic ID-based ElGamal Signature
Scheme
An ID-based signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract,
Sign, and Verify. In Setup, the trusted private key generator (PKG) chooses a
secret as the global secret key and publishes the global public system parameters.
In Extract, the PKG verifies a user’s identity and computes his private key.
In Sign, the user signs a message by using his private key. Finally in Verify,
the verifier verifies the signature by using the public parameters and the signer’s
identity.
An ID-based signature scheme can be obtained from the original ElGamal
signature scheme as follows:
• Setup: Let G1 be a cyclic additive group of order q generated by P . Let
G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order and e : G1×G1 → G2
be an admissible bilinear pairing. The PKG chooses s ∈R Z∗q as the global
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secret key and computes Ppub = sP as the global public key. The PKG
publishes system parameters 〈G1, G2, e, P, Ppub, H, H1〉 where H and
H1 are secure hash functions.
• Extract: PKG verifies the user’s identity ID and computes QID =
H1(ID) and SID = sQID as user’s public and private keys respectively.
• Sign: To sign a message m ∈ Zq, a user with his private key SID, first
chooses k ∈R Zq, then computes:
r = H(kP )
U = k−1(mP − rSID)
The signature for the message m is (kP, U)
• Verify: Given ID, a message m, and a signature (kP, U), the signature is
valid if the following equation holds.
e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)
r ?= e(P, P )m (2.1)
Correctness of the given scheme can be shown easily by using the bilinearity
properties of e. Notice that if (kP, U) is a valid signature for m then we have:
e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)
r = e(k−1(mP − rSID), kP )e(QID, Ppub)r
= e(mP − rSID, P )e(rSID, P )
= e(mP,P )
= e(P, P )m
The above scheme is the ID-based version of the original ElGamal signature
scheme. The conversion process, which will also be used for other signature
equations, is described below:
In the original ElGamal scheme, the signature equation is m ≡ αr + ks mod
(p− 1) where r = gk and the signature is (r, s). Since additive elliptic curve
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groups are used in ID-based structure, the signing equation and r will be slightly
different. Signing equation for the ID-based ElGamal signature is:
mP = rSID + kU
Uppercase letters are used to denote elements of the elliptic curve group. SID is
the private key of the user, so it is a natural replacement for α in the original
scheme. U is a part of the signature and it is the replacement for s. We cannot
use m directly since it is not a member of elliptic curve group; therefore mP is
used to replace m. Here we can also use mQID or mPpub instead of mP and get
a slightly different signature scheme.
A natural choice for r in the ID-based scheme is to compute r as r = kP
since r equals gk in the original scheme. However, r must be an integer in Zp in
the signature equation, so we use a hash function and compute r as r = H(kP ).
Additionally, since kP is needed for verification (??), the signature will be issued
as (kP, U) instead of (r, U).
2.3 The Generalized ID-based ElGamal Signa-
ture and its Variants
We can generalize the above ID-based signature scheme by using the generalized
signing equation
A = BSID + kC
where (A,B,C) is a permutation of the parameters (m, r, U), instead of the basic
equation mP = rSID + kU . Note that, not all the permutations generate useful
variants. We should consider that U is a member of elliptic curve group, and
m, r ∈ Zp. Accordingly, A and C should be members of the elliptic curve group,
but not B. Also note that, we can use mP and rP instead of m and r , in cases
where they need to be members of the elliptic curve group.
We get four variants by simply permuting the elements of (m, r, U). The
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signing equation for these variants are:
mP = rSID + kU (2.2)
U = rSID + kmP (2.3)
U = mSID + krP (2.4)
rP = mSID + kU (2.5)
Note that, the two variants where U is a coefficient of SID do not produce useful
signing equations.
In the variants where kP is not needed for verification, r can be computed as
e(P, P )k and the signature for m will be (r, U). This has the advantage that we
can get rid of one pairing operation in the verification phase. Additionally, since
the signer knows k, he can compute e(P, P )k without any pairing computation.
As can be seen in Table ??, r is taken as e(P, P )k in (??) and (??). Note that,
in (??) and (??), we need the value of kP for verification. In that case r will be
computed as r = H(kP ) and the signature for m will be (kP, U). We can also
compute r as H(m, kP ) instead of H(kP ) or e(P, P )k. In that case, m does not
need to occur in the signing equations.
We can generate more variants by using different permutations. Instead of
choosing (A,B,C) as a permutation of (m, r, U), we can also choose them as a
permutation of (mr,U, 1), (mr,mU, 1) and (mr, rU, 1). Signs of A,B, and C can
be changed by multiplying them by±1. We can also use a general function f(m, r)
instead of just product mr. Note that, unlike the original ElGamal variants, we
cannot choose (A,B,C) as a permutation of (mU, rU, 1), since we cannot extract
U from the signing equation in these variants. The signature equations for these
ID-based ElGamal variants can be found in Table ??.
The verification equations and other details for all signatures are summa-
rized in Table ??. Group I lists the variants that are obtained by permuting
(m, r, U) and (1, r, U). Group II lists the variants that are obtained by per-
muting (mr,U, 1). Group III lists the variants that are obtained by permut-
ing (mr,mU, 1). Group IV lists the variants that are obtained by permuting
(mr, rU, 1) and (r, rU, 1). Group V shows the rU variants discussed in Section ??.
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No. A B C ElGamal Variant ID-Based Signature
ID I.1 m r U m ≡ αr + ks mP = rSID + kU
ID I.2 r m U r ≡ αm+ ks rP = mSID + kU
ID I.3 U r m s ≡ αr + km U = rSID + kmP
ID I.4 U m r s ≡ αm+ kr U = mSID + rkP
ID II.1 1 mr U 1 ≡ mrα+ ks P = mrSID + kU
ID II.2 mr 1 U mr ≡ α+ ks mrP = SID + kU
ID II.3 U mr 1 s ≡ mrα+ k U = mrSID + kP
ID II.4 U 1 mr s ≡ α+ kmr U = −SID −mrkP
ID III.1 1 mr mU 1 ≡ mrα+ kms P = mrSID +mkU
ID III.2 mr 1 mU mr ≡ α+ kms mrP = SID + kmU
ID III.3 mU mr 1 ms ≡ mrα+ k mU = mrSID + kP
ID III.4 mU 1 mr ms ≡ α+ kmr mU = SID +mrkP
ID IV.1 mr 1 Ur mr ≡ α+ krs mrP = SID + rkU
ID IV.2 1 mr Ur 1 ≡ mrα+ krs P = mrSID + rkU
ID IV.3 Ur 1 mr rs ≡ α+mrk rU = SID +mrkP
ID IV.4 Ur mr 1 rs ≡ mrα+ k rU = mrSID + kP
Table 2.1: ElGamal variants and the corresponding ID-based ElGamal signature
equations.
Finally group VI shows the variants discussed in Section ?? that were not possible
on the basic ElGamal signatures.
2.4 Security Analysis of Proposed Schemes
The generalized ElGamal signature schemes of Horster et al. [?] are believed to be
secure except two insecure variants. The two insecure variants in the generalized
ElGamal signature schemes are the rs and ms variants as discussed in Section ??.
The corresponding ID-based variants are the rU andmU variants. These variants
occur if (A,B,C) is a permutation of (rU,m, 1) or (mU, r, 1), respectively.
The mU variants are completely insecure and the attack works similar to
the attack for the ms variant of the basic ElGamal signature: Assume that the
(r, U) pair is a valid signature observed by the adversary for message m. For an
arbitrary message m′, the adversary computes U ′ = m′−1mU and uses r′ = r.
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Signature equation Verification equation
V.1 mP = SID + rkU e(U, kP )
re(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )
m
V.2 P = mSID + rkU e(U, kP )
re(QID, Ppub)
m = e(P, P )
V.3 rU = −mSID + kP e(U, rP )e(QID, Ppub)m = r
V.4 rU = −SID +mkP e(U, rP )e(QID, Ppub) = rm
V.5 P = SID + rkU e(U, kP )
re(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )
V.6 rU = −SID + kP e(U, rP )e(QID, Ppub) = r
Table 2.2: the rU variants
Then (r′, U ′) pair will be a valid signature for m′.
This is not always the case for the rU variants; the attack on the basic ElGa-
mal rs variants does not work for two of the four ID-based rU variants. Signature
and verification equation for the rU variants can be seen in Table ??.
In Table ??, the variants V.3, V.4 and V.6 are insecure. The attack for these
rU variants works as follows: For an arbitrary message m, the adversary chooses
C ∈R G1. Then he substitutes e(C,P ) for e(U, rP ) in the verification equation
and computes r. After that, he computes U = r−1C. The (r, U) pair will be a
valid signature for the message m.
The variants V.1, V.2 and V.5 in Table ?? seem to be secure since an attacker
cannot extract r from the verification equation. Therefore, we have three more
ID-based signatures from the rU variants.
2.5 Efficiency of the Proposed Schemes
As the main computational cost, we consider the number of bilinear pairings,
modular exponentiations, and scalar multiplications in elliptic curve group. We
assume the value of e(P, P ) is precomputed by every party.
Computing a signature requires a scalar multiplication in G1 or an expo-
nentiation in G2 depending on how r is computed, as well as on or two scalar
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multiplication in G1 depending on the signature equation.
The cost of verifying a signature will be dominated by the pairing computa-
tions, which is the most expensive operation. Two or three pairing computations
are needed to verify a signature depending on the signing equation. Note that,
the value e(QID, Ppub) is fixed for a particular user, so it needs to be computed
once for each user.
More efficient variants can be obtained by modifying the generalized signature
equation (??) as
A = BSID + kCSID (2.6)
Note that, this kind of generalization is not possible for the basic ElGamal sig-
nature because when k and α are used together we cannot extract s from the
signing equation.
By the help of bilinear pairings we can solve U from the signature equation
(??) if we choose (A,B,C) as a permutation of (m, r, U), (mr,U, 1) or (m, rU, 1).
Note that B and C cannot be a member of the elliptic curve group; hence U
should be in A’s position. So we get six more variants by using equation (??).
These variants are:
U = rSID + kmSID
U = mSID + krSID
U = rmSID + kSID
U = SID + kmrSID
rU = mSID + kSID
rU = SID + kmSID
The value of kQID will be needed for verification. Therefore r is computed as
r = H(kQID) for these variants. For a messagem the signature will be (kQID, U).
We can also compute r as r = H(m, kQID) and remove m from the signing
equations. Group VI of Table ?? shows the verification equations and other
details for these schemes.
As observed by Barreto et al. [?], the number of pairing operations needed
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can be reduced further by changing the definitions of SID and QID as
QID = (H1(ID) + s)P,
SID = (H1(ID) + s)
−1P.
For instance, for the signature (r, U), r = e(P, P )k, U = (k + mr)SID, the
verification equation becomes
r = e(U,QID)e(P, P )
−mr,
and the number of pairing evaluations needed is reduced to one.
A similar modification can also be applied to the other signature schemes
discussed in this thesis to reduce the number of pairing evaluations in each veri-
fication.
2.6 Embedding Previously Known ID-based
Signatures
Recently many ID-based signature schemes have been proposed. Most of these
signatures [?, ?, ?, ?] can be seen as special instances of our generalized scheme:
• In Paterson’s scheme [?], the signature (kP, U) is computed as
r = H(kP )
U = k−1(H2(m)P + rSID)
where H2 is a secure hash function. Paterson’s scheme is equivalent to ID
I.1 of Table ?? where a second hash function H2 is used for message digest.
• In Cha-Cheon’s scheme [?], the signature (kQID, U) is computed as
r = H(m, kQID)
U = (r + k)SID
Cha-Cheon’s scheme is the same as ID VI.7.
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No. r U Signature Verification
ID I.1 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(mP − rSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, P )m
ID I.2 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(rP −mSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)m = e(P, P )r
ID I.3 r = e(P, P )k U = kmP − rSID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r = rm
ID I.4 r = e(P, P )k U = rkP −mSID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)m = rr
ID I.5 r = H(m, kP ) U = k−1(P − rSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, P )
ID I.6 r = H(m, kP ) U = k−1(rP − SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )r
ID I.7 r = H(m, kP ) U = kP − rSID (kP,U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, kP )
ID I.8 r = H(m, kP ) U = rkP − SID (kP,U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, kP )r
ID II.1 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(P −mrSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)mr = e(P, P )
ID II.2 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(−SID +mrP ) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )mr
ID II.3 r = e(P, P )k U = kP −mrSID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)mr = r
ID II.4 r = e(P, P )k U = mrkP − SID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub) = rmr
ID III.1 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(m−1P − rSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, P )m−1
ID III.2 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(rP −m−1SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)m−1 = e(P, P )r
ID III.3 r = e(P, P )k U = m−1kP − rSID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r = rm−1
ID III.4 r = e(P, P )k U = rkP −m−1SID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)m−1 = rr
ID IV.1 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(mP − r−1SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r−1 = e(P, P )m
ID IV.2 r = H(kP ) U = k−1(r−1P −mSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)m = e(P, P )r−1
ID IV.3 r = e(P, P )k U = mkP − r−1SID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r−1 = rm
ID IV.4 r = e(P, P )k U = r−1kP −mSID (r, U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)m = rr−1
ID IV.5 r = H(m, kP ) U = k−1(P − r−1SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r−1 = e(P, P )
ID IV.6 r = H(m, kP ) U = k−1(r−1P − SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )r−1
ID IV.7 r = H(m, kP ) U = kP − r−1SID (kP,U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r−1 = e(P, kP )
ID IV.8 r = H(m, kP ) U = r−1kP − SID (kP,U) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, kP )r−1
ID V.1 r = H(kP ) U = k−1r−1(mP − SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )re(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )m
ID V.2 r = H(kP ) U = k−1r−1(P −mSID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )re(QID, Ppub)m = e(P, P )
ID V.3 r = H(m, kP ) U = k−1r−1(P − SID) (kP,U) e(U, kP )re(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )
ID VI.1 r = H(kQID) U = (r + km)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P ) = e((r + km)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.2 r = H(kQID) U = (m+ kr)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P ) = e((kr +m)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.3 r = H(kQID) U = (rm+ k)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P ) = e((rm+ k)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.4 r = H(kQID) U = (1 + kmr)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P ) = e((1 +mkr)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.5 r = H(kQID) U = r−1(m+ k)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P )r = e((m+ k)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.6 r = H(kQID) U = r−1(1 + kmSID) (kQID, U) e(U,P )r = e((mk + 1)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.7 r = H(m, kQID) U = (r + k)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P ) = e((r + k)QID, Ppub)
ID VI.8 r = H(m, kQID) U = r−1(1 + k)SID (kQID, U) e(U,P )r = e((1 + k)QID, Ppub)
Table 2.3: The generalized ID-based ElGamal signatures and their verification
equations.
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• In Yi’s scheme [?], the signature (kP, U) is computed as
r = H(m, kP )
U = kPpub + rSID
Yi’s scheme is equivalent to ID I.7, where, Ppub is used instead of P and the
verification procedure is modified accordingly.
• In Hess’s scheme [?], the signature (v, U) is computed as
r = e(P1, P )
k
v = H(m, r)
U = kP1 + vSID
where P1 is an arbitrary point on the curve. Hess’s scheme can be converted
into ID II.3 with P1 = P and using mr instead of v = H(m, r). Besides, in
Hess’s scheme, verification takes an extra step for checking v
?≡ H(m, r).
Chapter 3
Generalized ID-Based ElGamal
Signatures with Message
Recovery
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of generalized ID-based ElGamal sig-
natures with message recovery and show that the previously proposed signature
schemes are special instances of this generalized scheme. The generalized scheme
also yields many new ID-based signatures with message recovery that have not
been explored before.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 ElGamal Signature Scheme with Message Recovery
Nyberg and Rueppel showed that the ElGamal signatures can be extended to
provide message recovery. The extension is done as follows: Let p be a large
prime, q a divisor of p− 1, and g an element in Z∗p of order q. The user chooses
α ∈ Zq as his private key and β = gα mod p as his public key. To sign a message
22
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m ∈ Zp, the user first generates a random number k ∈R Z∗q. Then he computes:
r = mg−k mod p
s = k−1(1 + rα) mod q
The (r, s) pair is the signature of message m. The equation,
1 = rα + ks mod q (3.1)
is called the signature equation and the message m can be recovered by comput-
ing m = gs
−1
βrs
−1
r mod p. We call this scheme as the basic ElGamal message
recovery scheme.
Note that, in the above scheme computation of the signature and message
recovery involve inversion of the elements in Zq. Nyberg and Rueppel showed that
it is also possible to get a signature without inversions. Signature computation
and verification can be done without inverses by changing the signature equation
as:
s = −αr + k mod q.
The messagem can now be recovered asm = gsβrr mod p without any inversions.
3.1.2 Generalized ElGamal Signatures with Message Re-
covery
Horster et al. [?] showed that many variations of the basic ElGamal message
recovery scheme are possible by modifying the signature equation (??). One can
use the general equation
A = αB + kC mod q
to obtain a signature, where (A,B,C) is a permutation of the parameters (1, r, s).
The parameter r can be computed as r = g−km or r = d(m, gk) with a suitable
function d : Z2p → Zp where d−1(r, gk) = m. The message m can be recovered
from the signature (r, s) by computing
m = d−1(r, gAC
−1β−BC
−1
mod p).
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The consistency of m should be verified by checking if m satisfies a certain re-
dundancy scheme as explained in Section ??.
Different signature schemes can be obtained by using different coefficients
instead of just using the permutations of (1, r, s). The coefficients (A,B,C) can
also be chosen as a permutation of (1, r, rs) or (1, s, rs). Additionally, the signs
of (A,B,C) can be changed by multiplying them by ±1.
The generalization can be extended further by choosing A,B,C as general
functions of r, s. In that case one of the functions should be chosen as 1 to get
efficient variants. Additionally, suitable functions should be chosen to guarantee
solvability of the parameter s. To guarantee security, the parameters r, s have to
occur in at least one of the three coefficients. Also, the insecure rs variant should
be avoided.
An insecure rs variant occurs if (A,B,C) is taken as a permutation of
(1, 1, rs): For some message m, an attacker chooses a random c ∈R Z∗q and
substitutes it for rs and computes g−k from the verification equation. Then he
computes first r from g−k and then computes s as s = cr−1. The (r, s) pair will
be a valid signature for the message m.
3.2 Basic ID-based ElGamal Signatures with
Message Recovery
An ID-based signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Extract,
Sign, and Verify. In Setup, the PKG, chooses a secret as the global secret
key and publishes the global public system parameters. In Extract, the PKG
verifies a user’s identity and computes his private key. In Sign, the user signs a
message by using his private key. Finally in Verify, the verifier verifies the sig-
nature and recovers the message by using the public parameters and the signer’s
identity.
An ID-based message recovery signature scheme can be obtained from the
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original ElGamal signature scheme as follows:
• Setup: Let G1 be cyclic additive group of order q generated by P . Let G2
be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order and e : G1 × G1 → G2
be an admissible bilinear pairing. The PKG chooses s ∈R Z∗q as the global
secret key and computes Ppub = sP as the global public key. The PKG
publishes system parameters 〈G1, G2, e, P, Ppub, H1〉 where H1 is a se-
cure hash function.
• Extract: PKG verifies the user’s identity ID and computes QID =
H1(ID) and SID = sQID as user’s public and private keys respectively.
• Sign: To sign a message m ∈ Zq, a user with his private key SID, first
chooses k ∈R Zq, then computes:
r = e(P, P )k ⊕m
U = k(P − rSID)
The signature for the message m is (kPpub, r, U)
• Verify: Given ID, and a signature (kPpub, r, U), the message can be re-
covered as:
m = r ⊕ (e(U, P )e(QID, kPpub)r)
Correctness of the given scheme can be shown easily by using the bilinearity
properties of e. Notice that if (kPpub, r, U) is a valid signature for m then we
have:
e(U, P )e(QID, kPpub)
r = e(k(P − rSID), P )e(QID, kPpub)r
= e(kP − krSID, P )e(krSID, P )
= e(kP, P )
= e(P, P )k
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3.2.1 Consistency Checking for the Message
In order to prevent a random (r, s) pair being accepted as a valid signature,
consistency of the message should be checked with a given redundancy scheme.
Abe and Okamoto [?] proposed such a redundancy encoding for their message
recovery signature which can also be used in our scheme: Let |q| denote the length
of q in bits. Let [m′]k1 denote the most significant k1 bits of m′ and [m′]k2 denote
the least significant k2 bits of m
′. Instead of computing r as r = e(P, P )k ⊕m,
first compute
m′ = F1(m)‖(F2(F1(m))⊕m),
where F1 : {0, 1}k2 → {0, 1}k1 and F2 : {0, 1}k1 → {0, 1}k2 are secure hash
functions; and compute
r = e(P, P )k ⊕m′.
Then the message m with length |k2| can be recovered as
m = [m′]k2 ⊕ F2([m′]k1).
Consistency of m can be verified by checking [m′]k1 ?= F1(m). The advantage of
using Abe and Okamoto’s redundancy encoding is that F1 and F2 can be seen as
random oracles so m′ will be a random value independent from m.
3.3 The Generalized ID-based Message Recov-
ery Signatures
We can generalize the above signature scheme by using the generalized signing
equation
A = SIDB + kC (3.2)
where (A,B,C) is a permutation of the parameters (1, r, U). Note that, the
variants where U is a coefficient of SID do not produce useful signing equations.
Also note that, P and rP are used instead of 1 and r in cases where they need
to be members of the elliptic curve group.
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No. r U Signature Message Recovery
MR I.1 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = kP − krSID (kPpub, r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )e(QID, kPpub)r)
MR I.2 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = kP − rSID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r)
MR I.3 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = krP − SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )r−1e(QID, Ppub)r−1)
MR I.4 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = krP − kSID (kPpub, r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )r−1e(QID, kPpub)r−1)
MR II.1 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = r−1kP − kSID (kPpub, r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )re(QID, kPpub)r)
MR II.2 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = r−1kP − SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )re(QID, Ppub)r)
MR II.3 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = kP − r−1SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r−1)
MR II.4 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = kP − r−1kSID (kPpub, r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )e(QID, kPpub)r−1)
MR III.1 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = r−1k(P − SID) (kPpub, r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,P )re(QID, kPpub))
Table 3.1: The generalized ID-based ElGamal signatures with message recovery.
We get four variants by permuting the elements of (1, r, U). The signing
equation for these variants are:
P = rSID + k
−1U (3.3)
U = rSID + kP (3.4)
U = SID + krP (3.5)
rP = SID + k
−1U (3.6)
In (??) and (??) the signature for m will be (r, U) and we can recover m
without any extra information. However, in (??) and (??) we need the value of
kPpub for verification, and the signature will be (kPpub, r, U).
More variants can be generated by using different permutations. Instead of
choosing (A,B,C) as a permutation of (1, r, U), we can also choose them as a
permutation of (1, r, rU). Also, signs of A, B and C can be changed by multi-
plying them by ±1. Note that, unlike the generalized ElGamal message recovery
signatures, we cannot choose (A,B,C) as a permutation of (1, U, rU), since we
cannot extract U from the signing equation.
The verification equations and other details for these signatures are summa-
rized in Table ??. Group I lists the variants that are obtained by permuting
(1, r, U) and Group II lists the variants obtained by permuting (1, r, rU). Group
III is the secure (1, 1, rU) variant which is discussed in Section ??.
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3.3.1 Generalized Partial Message Recovery Signatures
In the above signature schemes, length of the message is fixed. If Abe and
Okamoto’s redundancy encoding is used, then |m| = k2. Here we show how
one of the previous schemes can be modified to allow arbitrary length messages
by splitting the message m into two parts called m1 and m2. The first part m1
is of arbitrary length and is given with the signature (r, U). The second part m2
has a fixed length and is recovered from the signature.
As an example, consider MR I.2 of Table ??. To sign a message m = m1‖m2
with m2 ∈ Zq, a user with his private key SID, first chooses k ∈R Zq, then
computes:
r = e(P, P )k ⊕m2
U = kP −m1rSID
The signature for the message m is (m1, r, U). Note that, a general function
f(m1, r) can be used instead of the product m1r.
To verify a given signature (m1, r, U), the message can be recovered as:
m2 = r ⊕ (e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub)m1r)
m = m1‖m2
Correctness of this scheme can easily be shown by using the bilinearity prop-
erties of e. Consistency of m should be verified by checking if m satisfies a certain
redundancy scheme.
3.3.2 Security of the Signatures
Similar to the meta-ElGamal signature schemes with message recovery [?], gen-
eralized ID-based signatures with message recovery are generally secure except
the insecure rU variants. These variants occur if (A,B,C) is either (rU, 1, 1) or
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(1, 1, rU). Signing equations for these variants are:
rU = −SID + kP (3.7)
P = SID + rk
−1U (3.8)
In (??) the message m should satisfy the verification equation
m = r ⊕ (e(U, P )re(QID, Ppub))
This signature is not secure and the rU attack for this signature works as follows:
For arbitrary message m, the adversary chooses T ∈R G1. The random T will be
used instead of rU so the adversary substitutes e(T, P ) for e(U, P )r and computes
e(P, P )k as
e(P, P )k = e(T, P )e(QID, Ppub)
Then he computes r as r = e(P, P )k ⊕m. After that, he computes U = r−1C.
The (r, U) pair will be a valid signature for the message m.
The verification equation for the signature obtained from (??) is
m = r ⊕ (e(U, P )re(QID, kPpub))
This signature seems to be secure and the rU attack does not work because the
verification equation contains kPpub. Therefore, an attacker cannot extract r from
the verification equation.
3.4 More Efficient Signatures
As the main computational cost, we consider the number of bilinear pairings,
modular exponentiations, and scalar multiplications in elliptic curve group. We
assume the value of e(P, P ) is precomputed by every party.
Computing a signature requires one or two scalar multiplications in G1 de-
pending on how the signature equation is defined, as well as an exponentiation
in G2. Pairing evaluation is not needed to sign a message.
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The cost of verifying a signature will be dominated by the pairing compu-
tations, which is the most expensive operation. Two pairing computations are
needed to verify a signature. Note that, in some of the proposed schemes (MR
I.2, MR I.3, MR II.2, MR II.3), the value e(QID, Ppub) is used, which is fixed for
a particular user and needs to be computed only once for each user.
The number of pairing operations can be reduced to one by changing the
definitions of SID and QID as in [?]. If we define
QID = (H1(ID) + s)P
SID = (H1(ID) + s)
−1P,
the number of pairing evaluations can be reduced to one. Note that, QID can be
computed by anyone, since the value of sP is public, but SID cannot be computed
without knowing the value of s.
We can get efficient variants by changing the definitions of SID and QID in
four of the proposed schemes. These schemes are MR I.2, MR I.3, MR II.2, MR
II.3 of Table ??. The computation of r should also be changed to increase the
efficiency. Instead of computing r as r = e(P, P )k ⊕m, r will be computed as
r = e(P,QID)
k ⊕m
This modification does not affect the efficiency of signature computation, since
the value e(P,QID) can be precomputed by the sender.
As an example, consider the modified version of MR I.2 where U = kP−rSID.
The message m can be recovered from the signature (r, U) as,
m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)e(P, P )r).
The verification equations and other details of the efficient versions of MR I.2,
MR I.3, MR II.2, MR II.3 modified in this fashion are given in Group IV of
Table ??.
Further variants with a reduced signing cost can be obtained by modifying
the generalized signature equation as,
A = BSID + kCSID. (3.9)
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No. r U Signature Message Recovery
MR IV.1 r = e(P,QID)k ⊕m U = kP − rSID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)e(P, P )r)
MR IV.2 r = e(P,QID)k ⊕m U = krP − SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)r−1e(P, P )r−1)
MR IV.3 r = e(P,QID)k ⊕m U = r−1kP − SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)re(P, P )r)
MR IV.4 r = e(P,QID)k ⊕m U = kP − r−1SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)e(P, P )r−1)
MR V.1 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = (k + r)SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r)
MR V.2 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = (1 + kr)SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)r−1e(P, P )−r−1)
MR V.3 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = r−1(k + r)SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)re(P, P )−r)
MR V.4 r = e(P, P )k ⊕m U = r−1(1 + kr)SID (r, U) m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r−1)
Table 3.2: Efficient ID-based signatures with message recovery.
Note that, this kind of generalization is not possible over the basic ElGamal
signatures, because when k and α are used together, we cannot extract s from
the signing equation.
By the help of bilinear pairings we can extract U from the signing equa-
tion (??), if U is in A’s position. We can get four more efficient variants whose
signing equations are:
U = (k + r)SID
U = (1 + kr)SID
rU = (k + r)SID
rU = (1 + kr)SID
As an example, in the first scheme where U = (k+ r)SID, the message m can be
recovered from the signature (r, U) as,
m = r ⊕ (e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r)).
The verification equations and other details of these signatures are given in Group
V of Table ??.
3.5 Embedding Previously Known ID-based
Message Recovery Signatures
Recently two ID-based message recovery signature schemes have been proposed.
These signatures [?, ?] can be seen as special instances of our generalized scheme.
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In Zhang et al.’s scheme [?], the signature (r, U) for the messagem is computed
as
m′ = F1(m)‖(F2(F1(m))⊕m)
r = H2(e(P, P )
k) +m′ mod q
U = kP − rSID
where H2 is a secure hash function. Zhang et al.’s scheme is equivalent to MR I.3
of Table ??, where a hash function H2 and Abe and Okamoto’s redundancy
encoding is used with a slightly different computation of r.
In Tso et al.’s scheme [?], the signature (r, U) for the message m is computed
as
m′ = F1(m)‖(F2(F1(m))⊕m)
r = H2(e(P, P )
k)⊕m′
U = (k + r)SID
where H2 is a secure hash function. Tso et al.’s scheme is equivalent to MR
IV.1 of Table ?? where a hash function H2 and Abe and Okamoto’s redundancy
encoding is used.
Chapter 4
Generalized ID-Based Blind
Signatures
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of generalized ID-based blind signatures.
First we convert a blind ElGamal signature scheme into an ID-based counterpart.
Then we generalize the signature scheme by using the ideas in Kalkan et al.’s re-
cent work [?]. The generalized scheme yields many new ID-based blind signatures
that have not been explored before and some of them are more efficient than the
previously proposed schemes.
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Modified ElGamal Signature Scheme
Original ElGamal Signature [?] is not suitable to get blind signatures. However,
it is possible to get blind signatures based on its variants. The modified ElGamal
Signature which is used as a base tool for the rest of the paper is as follows: Let
p be a large prime, q a divisor of p − 1, and g an element in Z∗p of order q. The
user chooses α ∈ Zq as his private key and β = gα mod p as his public key. The
parameters p, q, g, and β are public whereas the user keeps α secret. To sign a
33
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message, the user generates a random k ∈R Zq. Then he computes r = gk mod p
and s = αr + km mod q. The (r, s) pair is the signature of message m. The
equation
s ≡ αr + km (mod q) (4.1)
is called the signature equation, and verification is done by checking the con-
gruence r
?≡ (β−rgs)m−1 (mod p). Security of ElGamal signatures relies on the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP) since solving α from β or s from r,m, β can
be reduced to solving DLP in Z∗p.
4.1.2 Basic Blind ElGamal Signature Scheme
Chamenish et al. [?] showed that the above scheme can be extended to provide
blindness. The blind signature protocol in Fig. ??. between Alice and Nancy is
a blind version of the modified ElGamal signature.
Nancy Alice
k ∈R Z∗q
r˜ = gk mod p
r˜−→
a, b ∈R Z∗q
r = r˜agb mod p
m˜ = amr˜r−1 mod q
m˜←−
s˜ = r˜α + km˜
s˜−→
s = s˜rr˜−1 + bm mod q
output (r, s)
Figure 4.1: Blind Signature Protocol
In this blind signature protocol, signature equation is s = km + rα mod q
and the signature for the message m is (r, s). Verification is done by checking
r
?≡ (β−rgs)m−1 mod p, which is the same as the modified ElGamal scheme. By
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using the above protocol, Alice gets a valid signature for the message m from the
notary (Nancy) without revealing the message.
4.1.3 Generalized Blind ElGamal Signatures
Horster et al. [?] showed that many variations of the basic blind signature scheme
are possible by modifying the signature equation (??). One can use the general
equation
A˜ ≡ αB˜ + kC˜ (mod q) (4.2)
to obtain a signature, where α is the secret key of Nancy and (A,B,C) is the per-
mutation of parameters (m˜, r˜, s˜). The parameter r˜ can be computed as r˜ = gk and
Alice blinds r˜ with two random blinding factors a, b such that r˜ = ragb mod p.
Nancy signs the blinded message m˜ by using the generalized signature equa-
tion (??). The signature is verified by checking the equation gA ≡ βB + rC
(mod p), where (A,B,C) is the permutation of parameters (m, r, s). In order to
get a valid signature, the following two equations must hold.
A = aA˜CC˜−1 + bC mod q
B = bB˜CC˜−1 mod q
By using these equations it is possible to extract m˜ and s. Note that, s and s˜
cannot be in the equation for m˜ since m˜ is sent to Nancy before s and s˜ are
determined in the protocol. Therefore the value s cannot appear in C. This also
prevents getting a blind signature for the original ElGamal scheme.
The generalization can be extended further by choosing A,B,C as general
functions of m, r, s. In that case, one of the functions should be chosen as 1 to
get efficient variants. Moreover, suitable functions should be chosen to guarantee
solvability of parameters s, s˜ and m˜. Further details can be found in Horster et
al.’s paper [?].
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4.2 Basic ID-based Blind Signature Scheme
An ID-based blind signature scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, Ex-
tract, Sign, and Verify. In Setup, the PKG, chooses a secret as the global
secret key and publishes the global public system parameters. In Extract, the
PKG verifies a user’s identity and computes his private key. In Sign, the user
(Alice) and the signer (Nancy) run the blind signature protocol to get the blind
signature for a message. Finally in Verify, the verifier verifies the signature and
recovers the message by using the public parameters and the signer’s identity.
An ID-based blind signature scheme can be obtained from the blind signature
scheme described in Section ?? as follows:
• Setup: Let G1 be cyclic additive group of order q generated by P . Let G2
be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order and e : G1 × G1 → G2
be an admissible bilinear pairing. The PKG chooses s ∈R Z∗q as the global
secret key and computes Ppub = sP as the global public key. The PKG
publishes system parameters 〈G1, G2, e, P, Ppub, H, H1〉 where H and
H1 are secure hash functions.
• Extract: PKG verifies the user’s identity ID and computes QID =
H1(ID) and SID = sQID as user’s public and private keys respectively.
• Sign: To sign a message m ∈ Zq, Alice and Nancy run the blind signature
protocol: First Nancy chooses k ∈R Z∗q, then computes r˜ = e(P, P )k and
sends r˜ to the Alice. After receiving r˜ from Nancy, Alice chooses a, b ∈R Z∗q,
then computes r = r˜ae(P, P )b and blinds the message m as m˜ = amr˜r−1
and sends m˜ to Nancy. Nancy signs the blinded message m˜ by using the
signature equation (U˜ = r˜SID + km˜P ) and sends U˜ to Alice. Alice checks
whether (r˜, U˜) is a valid signature for m˜, then computes the signature U
as U = U˜rr˜−1 + bmP . Finally Alice outputs the signature (r, U) for the
message m. The protocol can be seen in Fig. ??.
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• Verify: Given ID, the message m and a signature (r˜, U˜), the signature is
valid if the following equation holds.
e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub)
−r = rm
Nancy Alice
k ∈R Z∗q
r˜ = e(P, P )k
r˜−→
a, b ∈R Z∗q
r = r˜ae(P, P )b
m˜ = amr˜r−1
m˜←−
U˜ = r˜SID + km˜P
U˜−→
e(U˜ , P )e(QID, Ppub)
−r˜ ?= r˜m˜
U = U˜rr˜−1 + bmP
output (r, U)
Figure 4.2: ID-based Blind Signature Protocol
Correctness of the given scheme can be shown by using the bilinear-
ity properties of e. Notice that, if (r, U) is a valid signature for m, then
e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub)
−r is
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= e(U˜rr˜−1 + bmP, P )e(QID, Ppub)−r
= e(U˜rr˜−1 + bmP, P )e(−rSID, P )
= e((r˜SID + km˜P )rr˜
−1 + bmP, P )e(−rSID, P )
= e(rSID + km˜rr˜
−1P + bmP, P )e(−rSID, P )
= e(km˜rr˜−1P + bmP, P )
= e(k(amr˜r−1)rr˜−1P + bmP, P )
= e(kamP + bmP, P )
= (r˜a + e(P, P )b)m
= rm
The above scheme is the ID-based version of the modified blind ElGamal
signature described in Section ??. In that scheme, the signature equation is
s˜ = αr˜ + km˜ mod q where r˜ = gk and the signature is (r, s). Since additive
elliptic curve groups are used in the ID-based structure, the signing equation and
r˜ are slightly different. The signing equation for the ID-based ElGamal signature
becomes,
U˜ = r˜SID + km˜P
In this signature equation, uppercase letters are used to denote the elements of
the elliptic curve group. SID is the private key of the user; so it is a natural
replacement for α in the original scheme. U is the second part of the signature,
replacing s. A natural choice for r˜ in the ID-based scheme is r˜ = e(P, P )k since
r˜ = gk in the original scheme.
4.2.1 Blindness Proof
A signature is said to be blind if a given message-signature pair and Nancy’s view
are statistically independent. That is, the signer cannot get any information on
the actual message and the resulting signature. If there always exists a unique
mapping between any view of the signer and any given message signature pair,
we can say that the signature is blind.
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In order to prove blindness we will show that for a given message-signature
pair (m, r, U) and any view of Nancy (m˜, r˜, U˜), there always exists a unique pair
of blinding factors a, b that maps (m˜, r˜, U˜) to (m, r, U). Since Alice chooses a, b
randomly, Nancy cannot get any information from her view and the signature
scheme will be blind.
For a signature (r, U) generated for message m during the protocol, the fol-
lowing equations must hold.
m˜ = amr˜r−1 (4.3)
r = r˜ae(P, P )b (4.4)
U = U˜rr˜−1 + bmP (4.5)
The blinding factors a and b can be uniquely determined from the first two
equations. a is determined uniquely from (??) as a = m˜m−1rr˜−1. From (??),
e(P, P )b = rr˜−a, since e(P, P ) is a generator for G2, therefore b is also unique. If
these a and b satisfy (??), the desired mapping will be found and the signature
will be blind. We know that
U = U˜rr˜−1 + bmP ⇐⇒ e(U, P ) = e(U˜rr˜−1 + bmP, P ).
So it is sufficient to show that e(U, P ) = e(U˜rr˜−1 + bmP, P ) to complete the
proof. Notice that, since (r, U) is a valid signature, the signature equation U˜ =
r˜SID + km˜P and the verification equation e(U, P )e(QID, P )
−r = rm should hold.
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No. r˜ U˜ r U m˜ Verification
BL I.1 e(P, P )k r˜SID + km˜P r˜
ae(P, P )b U˜rr˜−1 + bmP amr˜r−1 e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub)−r = rm
BL I.2 e(P, P )k m˜SID + kr˜P r˜
ae(P, P )b arr˜−1U˜ + brP a−1mr˜r−1 e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub)−m = rr
BL II.1 e(P, P )k SID + km˜r˜P r˜
ae(P, P )b U˜ + bmrP amrr˜−1 e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub) = rmr
BL II.2 e(P, P )k m˜r˜SID + kP r˜
ae(P, P )b aU˜ + bP a−1mrr˜−1 e(U, P )e(QID, Ppub)−mr = r
BL III.1 a−1r r˜SID + kP H(m, t) aU˜ + bP − H(m, e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)−r) = r
BL III.2 ar −SID + kr˜P H(m, t) U˜ + brP − H(m, e(U,P )r−1e(QID, Ppub)r−1 ) = r
Table 4.1: Generalized ID-based blind signatures, where t˜ = e(P, P )k and t =
t˜ae(P, P )b
Hence, we have e(U˜rr˜−1 + bmP, P ) equals
= e(U˜rr˜−1, P )e(P, P )bm
= e(U˜rr˜−1,P )(rr˜−a)m
= e(U˜ , P )rr˜
−1
rmr˜−am
= e(r˜SID + km˜P, P )
rr˜−1rmr˜−am
= e(r˜SID, P ))
rr˜−1e(km˜P, P )rr˜
−1
rmr˜−am
= e(SID, P )
rr˜m˜rr˜
−1
rmr˜−am
= e(QID, P )
rr˜amrmr˜−am
= e(QID, P )
rrm
= e(U, P ).
4.3 Generalized ID-based Blind Signatures
We can generalize the above signature scheme by using different signature equa-
tions. Instead of using U˜ = r˜SID + km˜P as the signature equation, we can
use
A = BSID + kC
in general, where (A,B,C) is the permutation of the parameters (m˜, r˜, U˜). Note
that, we can use P , m˜P and r˜P instead of 1, m˜ and r˜ in cases where they need
to be members of the elliptic curve group. However, not all the permutations
generate useful variants. We should consider that U˜ is a member of the elliptic
curve group so it cannot be used for B. Moreover, U˜ cannot be in the position of
C. Since, in that case, U and U˜ are needed to extract m˜; but, m˜ is sent to Nancy
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before U and U˜ are determined in the protocol. Therefore we can get only two
variants. The signing equation for these variants are:
U˜ = m˜SID + kr˜P (4.6)
U˜ = r˜SID + km˜P (4.7)
Two more variants can be generated by using the permutations of (m˜r˜, U˜ , 1).
The signing equation for these variants are:
U˜ = SID + km˜r˜P (4.8)
U˜ = m˜r˜SID + kP (4.9)
The verification equations and other details for these signatures are summarized
in Table ??. Note that, we can also use a general function f(m˜, r˜) instead of just
the product m˜r˜.
Another way of using ElGamal signatures to sign a message m is to mix m
into r by a hash function, instead of using m in the computation of U . In this
way, it is possible to remove m˜ from the signing equations by modifying the blind
signature protocol. If we remove m˜ from (??), the signing equation will be,
U˜ = r˜SID + kP. (4.10)
If we use (??) as the signature equation, we modify the blind signature protocol
as follows: Instead of sending r˜, Nancy computes t˜ = e(P, P )k and sends t˜ to
Alice. Alice computes t = t˜ae(P, P )k and r = H(m, t), where H is a secure hash
function. Then, she computes r˜ = a−1r and sends r˜ to Nancy. Nancy computes U˜
by using the signature equation (??) and sends U˜ to Alice. Alice checks whether
the signature is valid, computes U = aU˜ + bP , and outputs the signature (r, U).
The modified protocol can be found in Fig. ??.
Similarly, if we remove m˜ from (??) the signing equation will be,
U˜ = SID + kr˜P.
The verification equation and other details for these signatures can be found in
Table ??. Note that, removing m˜ from (??) and (??) does not generate new
variants.
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Nancy Alice
k ∈R Z∗q
t˜ = e(P, P )k
t˜−→
a, b ∈R Z∗q
t = t˜ae(P, P )b
r = H(m, t)
r˜ = a−1r
r˜←−
U˜ = r˜SID + kP
U˜−→
e(U˜ , P )e(QID, Ppub)
−r˜ ?= r˜
U = aU˜ + bP
output (r, U)
Figure 4.3: Modified Blind Signature Protocol
4.4 More Efficient ID-based Blind Signatures
Computing a signature requires two to four scalar multiplications in G1 and three
or four exponentiations in G2, depending on the signature equation, as well as one
pairing evaluation. The other pairing e(QID, Ppub) can be precomputed before the
signature protocol.
The cost of verifying a signature will be dominated by the pairing computa-
tions, which is the most expensive operation. Two pairing computations and an
exponentiation in G1 are needed to verify a signature. Note that, in the proposed
schemes, the value e(QID, Ppub) is used, which is fixed for a particular user and
needs to be computed only once for each user.
The number of pairing operations can be reduced to one by changing the
definitions of SID and QID as in [?]. If we define
QID = (H1(ID) + s)P
SID = (H1(ID) + s)
−1P,
CHAPTER 4. GENERALIZED ID-BASED BLIND SIGNATURES 43
No. r˜ U˜ r U m˜ Verification
BL IV.1 e(P,QID)
k r˜SID + km˜P r˜
ae(P,QID)
b U˜rr˜−1 + bmP amr˜r−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r = rm
BL IV.2 e(P,QID)
k m˜SID + kr˜P r˜
ae(P,QID)
b arr˜−1U˜ + brP a−1mr˜r−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P )−m = rr
BL IV.3 e(P,QID)
k SID + km˜r˜P r˜
ae(P,QID)
b U˜ + bmrP amrr˜−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P ) = rmr
BL IV.4 e(P,QID)
k m˜r˜SID + kP r˜
ae(P,QID)
b aU˜ + bP a−1mrr˜−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P )−mr = r
BL IV.5 a−1r r˜SID + kP H(m, t) aU˜ + bP − H(m, e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r) = r
BL IV.6 ar −SID + kr˜P H(m, t) U˜ + brP − H(m, e(U,QID)r−1e(P, P )r−1 ) = r
BL V.1 e(P, P )k (r˜ + km˜)SID r˜
ae(P,QID)
b U˜rr˜−1 + bmP amr˜r−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r = rm
BL V.2 e(P, P )k (k + r˜m˜)SID r˜
ae(P,QID)
b arr˜−1U˜ + brP a−1mr˜r−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P )−m = rr
BL V.3 e(P, P )k (m˜+ kr˜)SID r˜
ae(P,QID)
b U˜ + bmrP amrr˜−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P ) = rmr
BL V.4 e(P, P )k (1 + km˜r˜)SID r˜
ae(P,QID)
b aU˜ + bP a−1mrr˜−1 e(U,QID)e(P, P )−mr = r
BL V.5 a−1r (r˜ + k)SID H(m, t) aU˜ + bP − H(m, e(U,QID)e(P, P )−r) = r
BL V.6 ar (1 + kr˜)SID H(m, t) U˜ + brP − H(m, e(U,QID)r−1e(P, P )r−1 ) = r
Table 4.2: Generalized ID-based blind signatures, where t˜ = e(P,QID)
k in IV.5,
IV.6, t˜ = e(P, P )k in V.5, V.6 and t = t˜ae(P,QID)
b
the number of pairing evaluations can be reduced to one. Note that QID can be
computed by anyone, since the value of sP is public, but SID cannot be computed
without knowing the value of s.
By changing the definitions of SID and QID as described, we can get more
efficient variants of the proposed schemes. The computation of r should also be
changed in order to adapt to the changes. Instead of computing r = e(P, P )k, we
have
r = e(P,QID)
k.
This modification does not affect the efficiency of the signature computation,
since the value e(P,QID) can be precomputed by the sender.
The verification equations and other details of the efficient versions of the
signatures modified in this fashion are given in Group IV of Table ??.
Further variants with a reduced signing cost can be obtained by modifying
the generalized signature equation as,
U = ASID + kBSID,
where the signing cost is reduced by one scalar multiplication in the elliptic curve
group G1. Note that, this kind of generalization is not possible over the basic
ElGamal signatures, because when k and α are used together, we cannot extract
s from the signing equation.
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We can get six more efficient variants by this modification whose signing
equations are:
U = (r + km)SID
U = (k + rm)SID
U = (m+ kr)SID
U = (1 + kmr)SID
U = (r + k)SID
U = (1 + kr)SID
The verification equations and other details of these signatures are given in Group
V of Table ??.
4.5 Performance Comparison
In this section, we give a performance comparison of our proposed schemes and
the four available ID-based blind signature schemes [?, ?, ?, ?] based on bilinear
pairings. As the main computational cost, we consider the number of bilinear
pairings (denoted by B), modular exponentiations, (denoted by E), and scalar
multiplications in elliptic curve group (denoted by M). We assume the value of
e(P, P ) is precomputed by every party, and the value of e(P,QID) is precomputed
by the signer but not the verifier.
Among the proposed schemes, Group I, Group II, and Group III are the least
efficient schemes with signing cost of one pairing, two to four scalar multipli-
cations, and three or four exponentiations and verification cost of two pairings,
and one or two exponentiations. Group IV and Group V are the most efficient
schemes with the signing cost of one pairing, two to four scalar multiplications,
and three or four exponentiations and verification cost of one pairing, and one or
two exponentiations.
Compared to the previously proposed schemes, ZK02 [?] has the signing cost
of 2B+6M and verification cost of 2B+1E. In ZK03 [?], signing cost is 2B+6M
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Scheme Signing Cost Verification Cost
Group I 1B + 4M + 4E 2B + 2E
Group II 1B + (2-4)M + 3E 2B + 1E
Group III 1B + (2-4)M + 3E 2B + 1E
Group IV 1B + (2-4)M + (3-4)E 1B + (1-2)E
Group V 1B + (2-3)M + (3-4)E 1B + (1-2)E
ZK02 [?] 2B + 6M 2B + 1E
ZK03 [?] 2B + 6M 2B + 1M
HCW05 [?] 1B + 3M + 3E 2B + 1M
GWWL07 [?] 3B + 7M 4B
Table 4.3: Comparison of ID-Based Blind Signature Schemes
and verification cost is 2B + 1M . In HCW05 [?], signing cost is 1B + 3M + 3E
and verification cost is 2B + 1M . In GWWL07 [?] signing cost is 3B + 7M
and verification cost is 4B; however, GWWL07 [?] has the advantage that blind
signature protocol needs only one round.
Performance comparison of our schemes to the previously proposed schemes
can be found in Table ??. As the table shows Group IV and Group V are the
most efficient signatures with the smallest number of pairing evaluations.
Chapter 5
Generalized ID-Based
Signcryption Schemes
In this chapter, we introduce the concept of generalized ID-based signcryption
scheme. We show how an ID-based signature scheme can be converted into an
ID-based signcryption scheme and describe the details of the basic scheme. Then
we generalize the basic scheme. The generalized scheme yields many new sign-
cryption schemes that have not been explored before.
5.1 Model of ID-based Signcryption Scheme
An ID-based signcryption scheme consists of four algorithms:
• Setup: The private key generator (PKG), a trusted authority, chooses the
global secret key, computes the global public key and publishes it with other
system parameters.
• Extract: PKG verifies the user’s identity and computes user’s public and
private key. The private key should be sent to the user over a secure channel
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after this phase.
• Sign/Encrypt: An algorithm that takes the message m, sender’s private
key, recipient’s public key, and other public system parameters as input;
produces a signature on m using sender’s private key; produces a mask of
m using recipient’s public key; and outputs a ciphertext that includes the
signature and the mask.
• Decrypt/Verify: An algorithm that takes receiver’s private key, a ci-
phertext, and other public system parameters as input; removes the mask
on the message using receiver’s private key; and outputs 1 if the signature
is valid. Otherwise it outputs 0.
5.2 Basic ID-based Signcryption Scheme
An ID-based signature can be converted into an ID-based signcryption scheme as
follows: Instead of sending the message m with the signature, m is masked using
the recipient’s public key. The mask should be removed before checking that the
signature is valid. Recipient uses his private key to remove the mask.
The ID-based signcryption scheme can be obtained from ID I.1 of Table ??
as follows:
• Setup: Let G1 be a cyclic additive group of order q generated by P . Let
G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order and e : G1×G1 → G2
be an admissible bilinear pairing. The PKG chooses s ∈R Z∗q as the global
secret key and computes Ppub = sP as the global public key. The PKG
publishes system parameters 〈G1, G2, e, P, Ppub, H1, H2, H3〉 where H1,
H2, and H3 are secure hash functions.
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• Extract: PKG verifies the user’s identity ID and computes QID =
H1(ID) and SID = sQID as user’s public and private keys respectively.
• Sign/Encrypt: To sign a message m ∈ Zq, a sender with his private key
SIDA , first chooses k ∈R Zq, then masks the message m by using recipient’s
public key as,
c = m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k)
then computes,
V = kP
r = H2(V )
U = k−1(cP − rSIDA)
and the ciphertext for m is (c, U, V )
• Decrypt/Verify: Given ID, a message m, and a ciphertext (c, U, V ),
first the receiver removes the mask as,
m = c⊕H3(e(SIDB , V )), (5.1)
and computes r = H(V ). The signature is valid if the following equation
holds.
e(U, V )e(QID, Ppub)
r ?= e(P, P )c
Correctness of the given scheme can be shown by using the bilinearity prop-
erties of e. If (c, U, V ) is a valid ciphertext, then the mask successfully removed
on m since
e(SIDB , V ) = e(SIDB , kP )
= e(QIDB , kPpub)
= e(QIDB , Ppub)
k
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If (V,U) is a valid signature for m then we have:
e(U, V )e(QID, Ppub)
r = e(k−1(cP − rSID), kP )e(QID, Ppub)r
= e(cP − rSID, P )e(rSID, P )
= e(cP, P )
= e(P, P )c
As pointed out in [?], if the signature equation depends on only the public
parameters and the message, then the resulting ciphertext is not secure. This is
because, if a user signcrypts two messages m1, m2 and outputs a ciphertext of
one of the messages, then an attacker can verify the signature on the message
by simply trying m1 and m2 one by one in the verification equation and find out
which message matches the ciphertext. Therefore, we use the mask c instead
of m in the signing equations. In that case, an attacker can verify a signature
by using the public parameters and the ciphertext. However, he cannot get any
information on the message since m is not used in signature verification..
5.3 The Generalized ID-Based Signcryption
Scheme
We can generalize the above signcryption scheme. All signatures in Table ?? ex-
cept Group VI can be converted into signcryption schemes. The idea is masking
the message using the recipient’s public key and the receiver removes the mask
with his private key before checking that the signature is valid. Notice that in
some signatures in Table ??, r is computed as r = e(P, P )k in order to reduce the
cost of verification by one pairing computation. However, r cannot be computed
as e(P, P )k in the signcryption case since the value of kP is needed to remove
the mask on the message. Therefore, r is computed as H(kP ) for those signcryp-
tion schemes. The verification equations and other details for these signcryption
schemes are summarized in Table ??.
Signatures in Group VI of Table ?? cannot be converted into signcryption
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No. r U c Verification
SC I.1 H(V ) k−1(cP − rSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, P )c
SC I.2 H(V ) k−1(rP − cSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)c = e(P, P )r
SC I.3 H(V ) kcP − rSID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, kP )c
SC I.4 H(V ) rkP − cSID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)c = e(P, kP )r
SC I.5 H(c, V ) k−1(P − rSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, P )
SC I.6 H(c, V ) k−1(rP − SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )r
SC I.7 H(c, V ) kP − rSID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, kP )
SC I.8 H(c, V ) rkP − SID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, kP )r
SC II.1 H(V ) k−1(P − crSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)cr = e(P, P )
SC II.2 H(V ) k−1(−SID + crP ) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )cr
SC II.3 H(V ) kP − crSID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)cr = e(P, kP )
SC II.4 H(V ) crkP − SID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, kP )cr
SC III.1 H(V ) k−1(c−1P − rSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, P )c
−1
SC III.2 H(V ) k−1(rP − c−1SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)c
−1
= e(P, P )r
SC III.3 H(V ) c−1kP − rSID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r = e(P, kP )c
−1
SC III.4 H(V ) rkP − c−1SID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)c
−1
= e(P, kP )r
SC IV.1 H(V ) k−1(cP − r−1SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r
−1
= e(P, P )c
SC IV.2 H(V ) k−1(r−1P − cSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)c = e(P, P )r
−1
SC IV.3 H(V ) ckP − r−1SID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r
−1
= e(P, kP )c
SC IV.4 H(V ) r−1kP − cSID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)c = e(P, kP )r
−1
SC IV.5 H(c, V ) k−1(P − r−1SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub)r
−1
= e(P, P )
SC IV.6 H(c, V ) k−1(r−1P − SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )r
−1
SC IV.7 H(c, V ) kP − r−1SID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub)r
−1
= e(P, kP )
SC IV.8 H(c, V ) r−1kP − SID m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U,P )e(QID, Ppub) = e(P, kP )r
−1
SC V.1 H(V ) k−1r−1(cP − SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )re(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )c
SC V.2 H(V ) k−1r−1(P − cSID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )re(QID, Ppub)c = e(P, P )
SC V.3 H(c, V ) k−1r−1(P − SID) m⊕H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)k) e(U, kP )re(QID, Ppub) = e(P, P )
Table 5.1: The generalized ID-based signcryption scheme and their verification
equations, where V = kP and the ciphertext is (c, U, V ).
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schemes. The reason behind is that kQID is sent to the recipient in these signa-
tures and without kP recipient cannot remove the mask on the message. For-
tunately, this problem can be solved by changing the definitions of public and
private keys. This modification yields eight more signcryption schemes that in-
cludes the most efficient signcryption scheme proposed by Barreto et al. [?].
If we define
QID = (H1(ID) + s)P
SID = (H1(ID) + s)
−1P,
then the number of pairing evaluations can be reduced to one. Note that QID
can be computed by anyone, since the value of sP is public, but SID cannot be
computed without knowing the value of s.
By changing the definitions of SID and QID as described, we can convert
the signatures group VI of Table ??. The computation of the mask should also
be changed in order to adapt to the changes. Instead of computing c = m ⊕
H3(e(QIDB , Ppub)
k), the mask will be computed as
c = m⊕H3(e(P, P )k).
, and kQIDB is sent to the recipient instead of kP since recipient needs the value
of kQIDB to remove the mask. The computation of r should also be changed since
the ciphertext does not include kP anymore. r will be computed as r = e(P, P )k
or r = H(m, e(P, P )k) depending on the signing equation.
As an example, consider the modified version of VI.1 of Table ?? where U =
(r + km)SIDA . The value of r will be computed as r = e(P, P )
k, the mask will
be computed as c = m ⊕H3(e(P, P )k), and V = kQIDB . The ciphertext will be
(c, U, V ). To verify the signature, the recipient computes the following:
e(P, P )k = e(V, SIDB)
c = m⊕H3(e(P, P )k).
e(U,QIDA)e(P, P )
−r ?= e(P, P )km (5.2)
The signature is valid if equation ?? holds.
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No. r U c Verification
SC VI.1 H(V ) (r + km)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)e(P, P )−r = e(P, P )km
SC VI.2 H(V ) (m+ kr)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)e(P, P )−m = e(P, P )kr
SC VI.3 H(V ) (rm+ k)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)e(P, P )−rm = e(P, P )k
SC VI.4 H(V ) (1 + kmr)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)e(P, P )−1 = e(P, P )kmr
SC VI.5 H(V ) r−1(m+ k)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)re(P, P )−m = e(P, P )k
SC VI.6 H(V ) r−1(1 + kmSIDA) m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)re(P, P )−1 = e(P, P )km
SC VI.7 H(m,V ) (r + k)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)e(P, P )−r = e(P, P )k
SC VI.8 H(m,V ) r−1(1 + k)SIDA m⊕H3(e(P, P )k) e(U,QIDA)re(P, P )−1 = e(P, P )k
Table 5.2: The modified ID-based signcryption schemes and their verification
equations, where V = kQIDB and the ciphertext is (c, U, V ).
To verify a signature, a user should know the value of e(P, P )k, but he cannot
find it without SIDB . So, we do not need to use c instead of m as in the case of
the signcryption schemes in table ??.
The verification equations and other details for modified signcryption schemes
are summarized in Table ??.
5.4 Efficiency of the Proposed Schemes
As the main computational cost, we consider the number of bilinear pairings,
modular exponentiations, and scalar multiplications in the elliptic curve group.
We assume the value of e(P, P ) is precomputed by every party.
In the signcryption schemes in Table ??, computing a ciphertext (the signature
and the mask) requires two or three scalar multiplications in G1, one exponenti-
ation in G2, and a pairing evaluation. Note that the value e(QIDB , Ppub) is fixed
for a particular user, so it needs to be computed once for each user.
The cost of removing the mask and verifying the signature will be dominated
by pairing computations, which is the most expensive operation. Removing a
mask requires one pairing computation and verifying a signature requires two
or three pairing computations depending on the signature equation. Note that,
the value e(P, P ) is fixed, so it needs to be completed only once. Also the value
e(QIDA , Ppub) needs to be computed only once for each user.
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In the modified signcryption schemes in Table ??, computing a ciphertext
requires two scalar multiplications in G1, one exponentiation in G2. Note that,
computing a ciphertext does not need a pairing evaluation since e(P, P ) is a fixed
value.
The cost of removing the mask and verifying the signature require only two
pairing evaluations and two exponentiations in G2. These modified schemes are
far more efficient than the previously proposed schemes.
5.5 Embedding Previously Known ID-based
Signcryption Schemes
Recently several ID-based signcryption schemes have been proposed. Two of
these schemes [?, ?] can be seen as special instances of our generalized scheme,
three of them use same signatures equations as in our generalized scheme.
In Malone-Lee’s scheme [?], the ciphertext (c, U, V ) for the message m is
computed as
V = kP
r = H2(V,m)
U = rSIDA + kPpub
c = m⊕H3(e(QIDB , kPpub))
Malone-Lee’s scheme is equivalent to SC I.7 of Table ?? where m is used instead
of c in the computation of r and a slightly different signing equation is used.
In Barreto et al.’s scheme [?], the ciphertext (c, U, V ) for the message m is
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computed as
V = kQIDB
r = H2(V,m)
U = (k + r)SIDA
c = m⊕H3(e(P, P )k)
Barreto et al.’s scheme is same as SC VI.7 of Table ??.
In Libert et al.’s [?] scheme, McCullagh and Barreto’s [?] scheme, and Malone-
Lee’s [?] improved scheme, the different masking techniques are used, however,
the signature equations are same as the signature equations of SC I.7, SC VI.7,
SC VI.7 respectively.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
The ElGamal signature scheme is a key tool for constructing ID-based signa-
ture schemes. We used the ElGamal signature to obtain an ID-based signature
scheme. Then we showed how the basic ID-based ElGamal signature scheme
can be extended into a generalized ID-based signature scheme as in the work of
Horster et al. on basic ElGamal signatures [?]. We discussed which variants are
not possible and which variants are not secure in the ID-based setting. We also
presented some original variants which were not possible on the basic ElGamal
scheme.
Most of the ID-based signatures in the literature [?, ?, ?, ?] can be seen as
special instances of the generalized ID-based signature scheme described in this
paper. Therefore, our generalized scheme provides a unified framework for many
of the previously proposed ID-based signatures. This framework also yields many
new ID-based signature schemes that have not been explored before.
We extended our work to provide additional properties to our signature
schemes. We investigated ID-based signatures giving message recovery. We
showed how the basic ElGamal signature with message recovery can be converted
to an ID-based signature with message recovery. Then again we extended our ID-
based signature scheme into a generalized ID-based message recovery signature
as in the work of Horster et al. [?] on basic ElGamal signatures with message
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recovery. We also presented some original variants which were not possible in
the non-ID-based setting. Then, we modified some of our signatures to get more
efficient signatures providing message recovery.
The two ID-based message recovery signatures in the literature [?, ?] can
be seen as special instances of the generalized scheme. Our work also yields
many new ID-based signatures with message recovery that have not been explored
before.
Among the proposed schemes with message recovery Group IV and Group V
of Table ?? are the most efficient signatures, with just one pairing operation
needed in signature verification. Group V has the further advantage of reducing
the cost of the signature operation by one scalar multiplication in the elliptic
curve group G1.
ID-based blind signatures are also investigated in this thesis. We showed how
a modified blind ElGamal signature can be converted to an ID-based blind signa-
ture. We extended our basic ID-based blind signature scheme into a generalized
ID-based blind signature as in the work of Horster et al. [?] on the basic blind
ElGamal signature. We also presented some original variants which were not
possible in the non-ID-based setting. Then, we modified some of our signatures
to get more efficient blind signatures.
Among the proposed blind signatures, Group IV and Group V of Table ??
with just one pairing operation in signature verification, become the most efficient
ID-based blind signatures in the literature.
Lastly, ID-based blind signcryption schemes are investigated. We showed
how an ID-based signature scheme can be converted into an ID-based signcryp-
tion scheme. Then we generalized the idea and obtained signcryption schemes
from our ID-based signatures. Our work yields many new ID-based signcryption
schemes that have not been explored before.
For future work, ways of proving the security of the proposed ID-based signa-
ture schemes can be investigated. One can also try to improve the efficiency of
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the proposed signature schemes by changing the signature and verification equa-
tions. The ideas presented in this thesis can also be used to get new ID-based
signatures with more additional features. One can also try to use the ideas in
this thesis to get generalized versions of ID-based group signatures or hierarchical
ID-based signatures.
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